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Abstract 
This paper analyzes uncertainties surrounding the benefits and costs of a policy to reduce nitrogen 
oxides (NOX) emissions from electricity generation in the eastern United States. Under each of 18 scenarios 
examined, we find an annual policy would yield net benefits that are at least as great as those expected 
under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) currently planned seasonal policy. Preferred 
(midpoint) assumptions yield additional benefits of $724 million per year under an annual policy 
compared to a seasonal one (1997 dollars). The subset of 11 northeastern states benefit the most from an 
annual policy relative to a seasonal one, but relative net benefits are also positive in the remaining states 
in the region. An annual policy implemented on a national basis appears to be slightly less cost-effective 
than the EPA’s policy under midpoint assumptions but it is more cost-effective under half of the scenarios 
we examine. 
Key Words:   emissions trading, electricity, particulates, nitrogen oxides, NOX, health benefits, 
market structure, restructuring, deregulation, value of statistical life, uncertainty 
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Executive Summary 
Emissions of NOX contribute to high concentrations of atmospheric ozone that are 
associated with human health hazards. This has led the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to call on 19 eastern states, where the problem is most pronounced, to reformulate state 
implementation plans (SIPs) for reducing NOX emissions. This paper analyzes policies to reduce 
nitrogen oxide (NOX) emissions from electricity generation in the United States under various 
scenarios in which the magnitude of benefits and costs are uncertain. The analysis considers 
three NOX reduction policies: a summer seasonal cap in the eastern states covered by EPA’s 
NOX SIP Call, an annual cap in the same SIP Call region, and a national annual cap. All policies 
allow for emissions trading. Net benefits (benefits less costs) are calculated on the basis of 
particulate-related health effects and the cost of post combustion controls.  
For each of the three policies, we consider 18 scenarios, reflecting the range of prominent 
and plausible parameter values for three primary sources of uncertainty. One source of 
uncertainty is the future structure of the electricity market, for which we consider two 
possibilities—limited restructuring and nationwide restructuring—to capture the range of 
uncertainty surrounding NOx emissions levels from the electricity sector in the absence of an 
emissions policy. A second source of uncertainty is the epidemiological relationship between 
nitrates and premature mortality. From the epidemiological literature we choose a low, mid, and 
high value for the concentration-response (C-R) coefficient. The range of the C-R coefficient 
represents uncertainty pertaining to the mortality effects of nitrates. The third source of 
uncertainty is the economic valuation of premature mortality. From the economics literature we 
choose a low, mid, and high value for the value of a statistical life (VSL).  
Under all scenarios examined, we find an annual cap in the SIP Call region yields net 
benefits that are at least as great as those expected under EPA’s current plan to implement a 
seasonal cap. The preferred (midpoint) assumptions lead to additional net benefits of $724 
million per year under an annual policy compared to a seasonal one, but among all the scenarios, 
additional net benefits of an annual policy range from $0 to $3 billion per year (1997 dollars).  iv 
The distribution of the net benefits is not uniform within the SIP region. The subset of the 
SIP region that includes 11 northeastern states benefits the most under the SIP annual policy 
relative to SIP seasonal, and the remaining eight states in the SIP region would benefit the least, 
but under no scenario are the remaining eight states worse off due to the shift to the SIP annual 
policy.  
The seasonal policy is preferable by only a small amount to a national annual cap under 
preferred assumptions for uncertain parameters. However, the national annual policy is 
preferable in half of the scenarios we examine. Within the SIP Call region, a national annual 
policy would yield greater net benefits than either regional policy due to the reduction in 
atmospheric transport of pollutants from outside the region that occurs under a national policy. 
However, under such a policy net benefits outside the SIP Call region would not be favorable, at 
least when measured on the basis of particulate matter (PM)-health benefits alone.  
Consideration of omitted benefits, such as reduced nitrogen deposition and ozone, would 
strengthen the finding that an annual policy in the SIP Call region is more cost-effective than a 
seasonal policy. However, omitted benefits could play an important role when comparing a 
regional policy with a national policy, since the relative cost-effectiveness of the national annual 
policy is sensitive to the assumptions in the scenarios we model. Benefits from reduced ozone 
concentrations may be especially important, since in many western states the ozone season 
stretches beyond the five summer months that are relevant in the east.  It is also possible that 
benefits from reduced nitrogen deposition are important, though there currently is an incomplete 
understanding of the ecological effects. 
As the states move toward competition in the electricity sector, the net benefits of all of 
the policies tend to be systematically higher than when under regulation. However, the relative 
cost-effectiveness of the policies does not appear to be sensitive to the future structure of the 
electricity industry. 
In summary, we find strong evidence that EPA and the affected states should consider 
replacing the current initiative for the eastern United States—a seasonal program to reduce NOX 
emissions—with a new initiative aimed at annual reductions in the region. Further research and 
policy discussions addressing annual national standards are also warranted.  
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Uncertainty and the Cost-Effectiveness of Regional NOX 
Emissions Reductions from Electricity Generation 
Dallas Burtraw, Ranjit Bharvirkar, and Meghan McGuinness∗ 
1. Introduction 
The U.S. electric power sector is the focus of potentially far-reaching legislative 
and regulatory efforts to reduce emissions. The next big set of reductions is likely to 
occur with the implementation in 2004 of a regional summertime cap and trade program 
for nitrogen oxides (NOX). The current Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) plan 
would affect 19 eastern states plus the District of Columbia, and is motivated primarily 
by concerns about high summertime concentrations of harmful ground-level ozone in 
eastern U.S. cities, of which NOX emissions are precursors. The policy is known as the 
“SIP Call” because it calls for states to revise their state implementation plans (SIPs) for 
compliance with federal Clean Air Act goals. The program will require electricity 
generators throughout the East to reduce their average summertime NOX emission rate  to 
about 0.15 pounds per million Btu (MMBtu) of heat input at fossil fuel–fired boilers, 
leading to a reduction of 62% in summertime emissions in 2007 according to EPA 
estimates.1 The requirement is coupled with a regional cap and trade program similar to 
that which is currently in place for SO2 emissions, and for NOX emissions in a subset of 
the affected states. 
The SIP Call program would achieve important ozone reductions. However, as 
currently planned, the program ignores perhaps more important reductions of particulate 
matter (PM), as well as nitrogen deposition in ecosystems, that would accompany 
reductions in NOX. Whereas benefits from reducing ozone occur almost exclusively in 
the summer, the other benefits would be realized throughout the year. When reduced 
                                                 
∗ This research was funded by Resources for the Future. The project follows research funded previosly by 
the Joyce Foundation. The authors are appreciative of assistance from Alan Krupnick, Karen Palmer and 
Anthony Paul. 
1 The five-month summer emissions cap under this program is based on an average NOx emission rate of 
about 0.15 pound per million Btu’s of heat input at fossil fuel–fired boilers. The program would lead to 
annual reductions in NOx emissions of 22% by 2007 and summertime reductions of 40% in the same year 
(U.S. EPA 1998a.). In the SIP Call region, the program would reduce NOx emissions by 40% annually in 
2007 and by 62% in the summers (U.S. EPA 1998b, Table 2-1). Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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particulate concentrations and other benefits of reductions in NOX emissions are taken 
into account, an alternative policy design may emerge as more cost-effective. 
Recent papers and proposals have highlighted potential alternatives to the planned 
seasonal SIP Call program. Burtraw et al. (2001) conducted a cost-effectiveness analysis 
that compared the seasonal program with both an annual cap-and-trade program in the 
SIP Call region, as well as an annual national program. The study concluded that an 
annual program in the SIP Call region would be the most cost-effective approach when 
benefits from reduced concentrations of PM plus additional costs were taken into 
account. The annual program in the SIP region would yield more than $400 million per 
year (1997 dollars) in additional net benefits (benefits minus costs) compared to a 
seasonal program based only on health effects. However, the paper does not find a 
justification for extending the program geographically to cover the entire nation. 
Palmer et al. (2001a) examine just two policy options, seasonal and annual 
programs in the SIP Call region. However, that paper considered two possible structures 
for the electricity market, and found a substantial difference in cost-effectiveness as a 
result of market structure. Compared to the current mix of regulation and competition, 
nationwide competition in the electricity industry would increase emissions in the 
absence of a NOX policy. Therefore, achieving an emission cap under the policies would 
yield greater health benefits but also entail greater costs. In sum, under nationwide 
competition, an annual program would yield $770 million (1997 dollars) in additional net 
benefits compared to a seasonal program.  
In addition to these simulation studies, some advocates have called for a re-
examination of the program in favor of annual controls on NOX emissions (Gutt et al., 
2000). Annual controls also have become the focus of proposed legislation at the federal 
level. 
Results from the previous analyses have been couched in an acknowledgement 
that there exists tremendous uncertainty about various aspects of the integrated models 
that are used, though they have not accounted in a systematic way for sources of 
uncertainty. In addition, the assumptions used to parameterize the earlier exercises are 
controversial because of uncertainty surrounding key aspects of the assessment. The Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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omission of an analysis of uncertainty is not without consequence because alternative 
realizations of uncertain variables might either reinforce or alter the suggested ordering of 
policies from a cost-effectiveness perspective. 
This paper re-examines the set of policies that have been considered previously 
and identifies the major sources of uncertainty in the analyses that could contribute to 
different conclusions. Previous literature leads us to focus in detail on three issues. One is 
the characterization of the electricity market structure in the future, and associated 
projections of emissions in the absence of a policy. Palmer et al. (2001a) considered 
alternative realizations for the industry, but not in combination with any other potential 
sources of uncertainty and not for all of the policies we consider. 
A second source of uncertainty is the characterization of the epidemiology of 
premature mortality in response to changes in atmospheric concentrations of pollutants. A 
three-fold difference in this response can be reasonably explored, based on the existing 
literature.  This translates directly into a three-fold difference in mortality-related health 
benefits, which are the largest share of estimated benefits. A third source of uncertainty is 
the economic valuation of small changes in the risk of premature mortality. Again, the 
literature suggests that nearly a three-fold range of values can be reasonably assumed, 
translating directly into a three-fold difference in mortality-related health benefits. 
Considered in combination, the uncertainties surrounding these three questions can lead 
to an order of magnitude difference in expected mortality-related benefits of reductions in 
NOX, an important difference in the measure of costs, and dramatic changes in the 
relative cost-effectiveness of the policies. 
We consider three NOX reduction scenarios mentioned previously in light of these 
uncertainties. The policies include a summer seasonal cap in the eastern states covered by 
EPA’s NOX SIP Call, an annual cap in the same SIP Call region, and a national annual 
cap. The uncertainties include two possible outcomes for market structure, three possible 
interpretations of the epidemiology, and three possible interpretations of the valuation 
literature, making for 18 scenarios in total. We estimate net benefits for each of the three 
policy options under the 18 possible realizations of the uncertain factors. Net benefits 
include particulate-health related effects of NOX, and exclude the effects of ozone on Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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health and other particulate-related benefits. Cost is measured as the annualized capital 
and operating cost of post-combustion controls. 
Two clear conclusions emerge from the analysis. The first is that, in every 
scenario, an annual cap in the SIP Call region yields net benefits (benefits less costs) that 
are at least as great as those expected under the EPA’s current policy to implement a 
seasonal cap. The additional net benefits of an annual policy range from $0 to $3.7 billion 
(1997 dollars); under our preferred assumptions, net benefits improve by $724 million 
compared to the current seasonal policy. The consideration of omitted benefits from this 
accounting strengthens the relative cost-effectiveness of an annual policy in the SIP Call 
region compared to the current seasonal approach. This provides compelling evidence in 
support of previous suggestions that the EPA and the affected states should consider 
annual policies in place of the seasonal policy currently envisioned under the NOX SIP 
Call. 
The second conclusion is that the relative cost-effectiveness of a national annual 
policy sits on a knife-edge with respect to each of the uncertainties. The seasonal policy 
is slightly preferable to a national annual cap under preferred (midpoint) values for 
uncertain parameters. An annual policy at the national level would yield greater net 
benefits to the SIP Call region than either an annual or seasonal policy in that region due 
to the reduction in atmospheric transport of pollutants from outside the region. Net 
benefits outside the region under a national policy would not be favorable, at least when 
measured solely on the basis of PM-health benefits. However, if any of the three 
uncertain parameters realize high-end values relative to our original preferred 
assumptions, the national annual cap could be preferable to a seasonal policy after taking 
into account the benefits we do not measure. Thus, additional information about the 
magnitude of omitted benefits is important to determining the relative cost-effectiveness 
of a national policy.  
2. Previous Literature and Major Sources of Uncertainty 
The analysis we conduct integrates models of the electricity sector, pollution 
transport, health epidemiology, and valuation. In this framework, we identify three 
questions as the most important sources of uncertainty. These include the structure of the Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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electricity market (i.e., whether the nation as a whole follows the lead of states that have 
already committed to competition in the electricity sector), the epidemiological 
characterization of mortality effects due to changes in concentrations of nitrates, and the 
valuation of changes in health status. In this section, we describe these uncertainties and 
why they are expected to be most important. 
2.1 Structure of the Electricity Market 
The passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 unleashed a process that is 
changing the regulatory and market structure of the U.S. electric power industry. The act 
called on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to order all transmission-owning 
utilities to allow open access to their transmission systems at nondiscriminatory, cost-
based transmission rates in order to facilitate competitive wholesale power transactions. 
At this time, 24 states plus the District of Columbia have passed legislation or made 
regulatory decisions to allow retail competition, as illustrated in the map in Figure 1. 
However, the timing varies among the states. Several states, including West Virginia and 
Oklahoma, have a long timeframe for implementation. Other states, including Oregon, 
Nevada, and New Mexico, have slowed their progress, and California has backed away 
from retail choice.  
An important question throughout the debate about electricity restructuring is how 
the move from regulation to competition will affect the environment. Many advocates 
have raised concerns that allowing more open access to transmission would lead to the 
increased use of older, dirtier coal-fired facilities in the Midwest and related increases in 
emissions. As different states debated whether to allow retail competition, some 
observers became concerned about the potential demise of utility programs that promoted 
demand-side management and the use of renewable energy sources, as well as the 
associated consequences for utility emissions and the environment. In addition, if 
restructuring were to deliver the lower prices for electricity as is expected, then increased 
levels of electricity demand could also yield higher emissions.  Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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Figure 1 Status of restructuring as of November 2001. Source: U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, Nov. 2001 (www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/regmap.html). 
 
Several previous studies, including those by Lee and Darani (1996), the Center for 
Clean Air Policy (1996a, 1996b, 1996c), and Rosen and others (1995), find potentially 
large increases in emissions of NOX and CO2 would result from increased interregional 
power trading. In two analyses of the proposed environmental impacts of its two 
transmission orders, U.S. FERC (1996, 1999) finds increased power trading has a much 
more limited effect on air emissions. EIA (1996) also finds that open transmission access 
increases NOX emissions to between 1% and 3% above the baseline scenario, with the 
largest effects happening in the early years.  
Palmer and Burtraw (1997) look at the potential impacts of electricity 
restructuring on NOX and CO2 emissions and on subsequent changes in atmospheric NOX 
and nitrate concentrations at the regional level, and also consider the ultimate effect on 
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estimates from the prior literature. Burtraw, Palmer, and Paul (1999) find electricity 
restructuring has substantially smaller impacts on NOX and CO2 emissions in the near 
term, with NOX emissions increases of 4% or less relative to the baseline and annual 
carbon emission increases of just under 2% in the absence of any policy to promote 
renewable energy sources. U.S. DOE (1999) looks at the emissions effects of the Clinton 
administration’s Comprehensive Electricity Competition Act of 1999 and demonstrates 
that the act, with its provisions to promote greater use of renewables and distributed 
generation, would have led to a reduction in NOX and carbon emissions compared with 
an average cost baseline.  
Most of the prior analyses of the effect of restructuring on emissions ignored the 
effect of EPA’s 1998 NOX SIP Call on summer NOX emissions from electricity 
generators in the eastern United States.  By imposing summertime caps on NOX 
emissions that apply to both new and existing generating facilities, this program 
eliminates the possibility of increasing aggregate summertime NOX emissions in the SIP 
Call region as a result of restructuring.  
Nonetheless, NOX emissions during other seasons and in other regions could rise 
as a result of increased power trading or increased generation to meet higher levels of 
demand brought about by anticipated lower prices under competition. These additional 
NOX emissions could contribute to higher concentrations of particulate matter, which 
have been firmly associated with morbidity and mortality effects. In addition, NOX 
emissions cause the deposition of nitrates, which contribute to environmental problems 
such as the acidification of some ecosystems. If NOX emissions from electricity 
generators were subject to an annual cap, then restructuring would have no effect on 
aggregate NOX emissions.  In response to the potential for increased emissions from 
restructuring, and also in response to the regional and seasonal nature of the EPA’s SIP 
Call, environmentalists have proposed expanding the NOX SIP Call to an annual program 
(Gutt, 2000).  
Uncertainty about the structure of the market has an influence on the cost of 
emission reductions, though the direction is not immediately obvious. The cost savings 
associated with technical improvements may offset some of the costs of greater NOX Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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controls, or introduce additional flexibility in compliance due to greater flexibility in the 
operation of generators, thereby lowering costs. Alternatively, efficiency improvements 
at existing coal plants could raise the value of the plants and raise the opportunity costs of 
substituting away from using these plants toward lower polluting plants. This change 
would raise the costs of reducing NOX emissions. Further, nationwide adoption of retail 
competition could generate greater inter-regional trading of electricity, particularly if 
widespread restructuring leads to expansion of inter-regional transmission capability as 
assumed in the scenarios modeled here.  For example, with greater transmission capacity, 
electricity generation could migrate out of the SIP Call region helping to reduce NOX 
emissions in the region and potentially lower the costs of achieving the NOX emission 
caps, but increasing emissions in the West. 
Two recent papers have analyzed emission scenarios that take into account the 
performance of the NOX SIP Call under alternative market structures. Using the modeling 
framework we use in this paper, Burtraw and others (2001) analyze “limited 
restructuring.” The analysis assumes that no states move to implement electricity 
restructuring beyond those that had made a decision as of 2000. That paper considered 
seasonal and annual NOX policies in the SIP Call region as well as a national annual NOX 
policy. A contrasting paper that uses the same modeling framework by Palmer and others 
(2001a) examined “nationwide restructuring,” but that paper considers only seasonal and 
annual NOX policies in the SIP Call region. Palmer and others find the movement to 
marginal cost pricing leads to an increase in electricity generation, much of which comes 
from existing coal-fired power plants. In the absence of a NOX cap, they find 
restructuring would lead to an annual increase of 369,000 tons of NOX (8%) in 2008. 
Even when restructuring is combined with a NOX policy in the SIP Call region, 
restructuring leads to greater quantities of NOX outside the region.2  
These two papers indicate that uncertainty about the structure of the market may 
have an effect on the distribution of NOX control costs born by producers and by 
                                                 
2 A related source of uncertainty is the assumption about future fuel prices. However, if natural gas supplies 
become limited, either due to natural availability or regulatory decisionmaking, then we would expect to 
see more coal-fired generation in both the baseline and in the policy cases we model. The result would be 
somewhat closer to the scenario involving the effects of marginal cost pricing in the electricity sector. Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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consumers. One reason is that whether the opportunity cost of emission allowances are 
reflected in electricity price depends on how allowances are allocated and whether a state 
is regulated. We assume allowances are allocated to firms at zero cost—so-called 
“grandfathering”—as currently intended by most states planning to participate in the NOX 
trading program and as characterized the SO2 trading program implemented under the 
1990 Clean Air Act amendments. In average cost regions, emission allowances are 
reflected in the calculation of total costs according to their original cost when acquired by 
the firm. Because the original allocation was at zero cost, only the costs of allowances 
acquired in excess of the original allocation are considered part of the total costs to be 
recovered in the price of electricity. In marginal-cost regions, the opportunity cost of 
NOX emissions allowances is reflected in the electricity price in a manner analogous to 
other variable costs of generation, such as fuel costs. In this case, NOX emission 
allowances are reflected in marginal costs to the extent that the marginal generating unit 
at any particular instant requires allowances to generate. When the marginal generating 
unit is coal-fired, the cost of NOX emissions allowances is fully reflected in the price of 
electricity paid by consumers. When the marginal generating unit is gas-fired, the cost of 
NOX emissions allowances will play a smaller role in the price of electricity because gas-
fired units typically have lower emissions per unit of generation, and producers will bear 
more of the cost of the NOX policy. 
2.2 Epidemiology 
Although there is substantial evidence that contribution to the global nitrogen 
cycle has significant ecological effects, the effect of nitrogen oxides and nitrates on 
human health is by far the most important of the problems that have been quantified in 
previous analysis (Lee et al.,1995; Hagler Bailly, 1995; European Commission, 1995). 
Analysis of the uncertainties surrounding estimates of benefits and costs of changes in 
conventional pollutants identified mortality as the environmental problem that would 
most benefit from additional research (Burtraw et al., 1998).  We focus specifically on 
the uncertainty pertaining to the mortality pathway, which breaks down into two areas: 
epidemiology and valuation.  Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
10 
There are several sources of uncertainty that surface in the epidemiological 
literature.  First, there is considerable uncertainty as to the shape of the concentration-
response (C-R) function, and the presence or absence of a threshold level of pollutant 
concentration, below which there are no significant health effects observed.  
Traditionally, a linear model has been assumed for both ease of modeling and 
interpretation, as well as for the fact that the data has tended to fit such a model 
reasonably well.  The common C-R function is thus of the following form: 
10 PM Pop ate MortalityR C M ∆ × × × = ∆ , 
where M is the number of annual deaths, C is the C-R coefficient, representing a 
percentage change in the mortality rate (deaths per person per year) for a given change in 
PM10 concentration. Pop is the exposed population, and PM10 is measured in µg/m
3. 
While both the questions of functional form and the existence of a threshold have 
been debated in the literature, the case for a linear model with no threshold is strong. 
Most recently, a study by Daniels et al. (2000) suggests that linear models without a 
threshold are preferable for assessing the effect of particulate air pollution on both total 
mortality and respiratory/cardiovascular mortality at current levels.  
A second source of uncertainty is the problem of distinguishing between acute 
and chronic mortality, and the implications of doing so for the estimation of a C-R 
relationship.  There is a considerable body of literature estimating acute mortality effects 
of air pollution.  These studies use daily time series data to estimate the relationship 
between short-term changes in PM and daily death counts.  In general, these studies have 
suggested an increase in the daily mortality rate ranging from less than 0.5%-1.5%, with 
lagged pollution effects of up to five days, though generally closer to one.  A major 
criticism of these time series studies is that, by only reporting associations between daily 
mortality rates and pollution levels, they are unable to estimate the degree to which the 
excess mortality observed is due to mortality displacement—the amount of the excess 
mortality measure that is attributed to individuals of compromised health status with short Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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life expectancies in the absence of pollution.  This criticism has important implications 
for the valuation of mortality effects.3 
Studies of chronic mortality, or prospective cohort studies, have estimated 
changes in mortality rates due to long-term trends in air pollution concentrations.4  
Prospective studies track a group of individuals through time for a specified period, 
periodically monitoring the exposure of individuals and their health status. The C-R 
coefficients from the prospective studies have tended to be substantially larger than those 
from acute mortality studies, estimating an increase in the daily mortality rate of 3% or 
greater per 10 µg/m3 increase in particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter 
(PM10).  Of the handful of such studies that exist, Pope et al. (1995) is considered to be 
the most robust, for its large cohort (more than 295,000) and number of observed 
locations (50) in the study for particulate matter. However, Dockery et al. (1993) has 
been criticized for examining an inadequate number of locations, and the cohort in Abbey 
et al. (1993) has been criticized as being too small to yield reliable results.   
Addressing the differences in results between these two methodologies is 
complicated by the fact that the biological mechanism by which particulate matter affects 
human health remains elusive.  Furthermore, there are additional sources of uncertainty 
surrounding the parameter estimates from both types of studies.  First, there is the 
potential error that results from using ambient particulate matter concentrations as a 
proxy for personal exposure levels.  Second, there is the question of confounding from 
other pollutants or other potential risk factors.  An inability to sufficiently control for 
such factors in analysis will result in potentially biased C-R coefficients.  Among these 
potential risk factors are a number of socioeconomic, occupational, and weather 
variables.  While prospective cohort studies have the ability to control for obvious 
individual risk factors, such as cigarette smoking, there is still a possibility of inadequate 
control of other risk factors and variables of this type. 
                                                 
3 In studies where mortality benefits are estimated in terms of life-years lost, the presence of significant 
mortality displacement, assuming it could be accounted for, would dramatically reduce benefit estimates. 
4 Another group of studies of chronic mortality are ecologic studies, such as Lipfert (1994) and Ozkaynak 
and Thurston (1987), which correlate location-specific mortality rates with measures of pollutant 
concentration in each location.  However, these studies are typically dismissed as being unable to control 
for individual differences in risk factors, such as smoking behavior. Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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Further uncertainties result from issues of potential measurement error.  There is 
considerable uncertainty regarding the composure and uniformity of particulate matter.  
Epidemiological studies focus on a specific measure of particulate matter, typically total 
suspended particulates (TSP), or PM10 or PM2.5 (particulate matter less than 2.5 
microns in diameter), with mortality being believed to be more closely associated with 
smaller particles.  However, studies of health benefits might use a C-R coefficient for one 
particle size to estimate health benefits from reductions of a particle size that is either 
larger or smaller.  Doing so introduces uncertainty, in that converting C-R coefficients to 
represent another particle size requires assuming these particulate measures exist in 
constant proportion, an assumption that is unlikely to hold either temporally or spatially. 
Finally, there is additional uncertainty pertaining to the application of a selected 
C-R coefficient, which is often being estimated for one city or a subset of the population 
not representative of all socioeconomic groups, to the population at large.  Schwartz and 
Dockery (1992), for example, examine mortality only in the locality of Steubenville, 
Ohio.  Recent work by Samet et al. (2000) suggests that response to changes in PM 
concentration may vary significantly by region, with effects in the northeast being most 
sensitive.  Furthermore, Krewski et al. (2000) find evidence that C-R coefficients for PM 
vary significantly by education level, with risk decreasing at higher levels of educational 
attainment. Likewise, Pope et al. (1995) has been criticized for following a largely white 
and middle class population, potentially producing a downward bias in the coefficient. As 
methodologies improve, and such findings are corroborated by additional research, health 
effects estimates based on the epidemiological literature will be able to increasingly 
utilize such information. 
2.3 Valuation of Changes in Risk of Premature Mortality 
The second parameter that contributes importantly to the uncertainty along the 
air-health environmental pathway is the valuation of changes in the risk of premature 
mortality. Typically, this parameter is described as the value of a statistical life (VSL). 
Precisely, the parameter represents the willingness of a representative individual to pay  
to avoid small changes in risk. This value is divided by the magnitude of the change in Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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risk and the result is the estimated VSL.5 Since the VSL is the last parameter in the 
pathway linking changes in emissions to the estimate of benefits (B), the estimate varies 
directly with the VSL according to the function: B VSL M = ×∆ . The estimates of VSL 
that are found in the economic literature vary by more than an order of magnitude, but 
meta-analyses and most studies identify a range that varies by a factor of three, from 
about $2 million to about $6 million (1997 dollars). 6  
The preferred estimates of the VSL are derived using willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
estimates, which are obtained primarily through two methodologies.  The first is hedonic 
labor market studies, which employ revealed preference techniques by relating wage 
differentials to mortality risk differences across industrial or commercial sectors.  The 
underlying assumption behind these studies is, given competitive labor markets, workers 
in occupations with inherent risk should receive wage premiums equal to the value they 
place on increased mortality risk.  There are a number of uncertainties specific to the 
WTP estimates obtained in these studies.  First, there is not complete agreement in the 
literature as to the existence of a statistically significant relationship between the risk of 
death on the job and wage.  While the majority of studies do find such a relationship, 
Mrozek and Taylor (2002) report there are at least 16 that do not.  Among these are 
Moore and Viscusi (1988), Leigh (1991 and 1995), and Dorman and Hagstrom (1998).  
Second, specification of the hedonic wage equation can vary considerably, within and 
among studies, leading to substantial variation in WTP estimates.   It is likely that 
misspecification of the wage equation —particularly inadequate control of inter-industry 
wage differentials—as well as imprecise measurements of risk are the primary factors 
contributing to both the controversy over the wage-risk relationship and the variation in 
WTP estimates (Leigh, 1995; Dorman and Hagstrom, 1998; Mrozek and Taylor, 2002)   
                                                 
5 For example, if each individual in a population is willing to pay $50 for a mortality risk reduction of 
1/100,000, the implied VSL is $50 x 100,000=$5 million. 
6 An alternative to using a VSL is the value of a statistical life-year (VSLY), which is typically an 
annualized equivalent of a VSL estimate (Moore and Viscusi 1988) obtained by dividing a VSL estimate 
by the average life-expectancy of individuals within the study population.  It is also typically assumed that 
the individual discounts the value of future years. Two shortcomings of this approach are the assumption 
that the VSLY is independent of age, and the sensitivity of benefits estimates to the assumed discount rate, 
which is usually chosen somewhat arbitrarily by the researcher.   Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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Application of VSL estimates to the valuation of premature mortality effects 
raises several uncertainties pertaining to the issue of benefits transfer.  For one, the 
degree of mortality risk reduction for which WTP estimates are elicited in a given study 
may not correspond to the degree of mortality risk reduction for which benefits are being 
estimated.  The transfer of a given WTP estimate to a benefit analysis implicitly assumes 
a linear relationship between mortality risk reduction and WTP.  Rowlatt et al. (1998) 
suggest this is a reasonable assumption, provided the change in the risk being valued is 
within the range of risk evaluated in the studies underlying the assumed VSL.  
Furthermore, transferability depends upon the extent to which the population and 
risk in the study are comparable to the population affected and the risk that they face.  For 
example, epidemiological literature provides some evidence that excess mortality from 
particulate matter may disproportionately affect the elderly.  The elderly, however, have 
not been adequately represented in most studies estimating WTP. In particular, labor 
market studies typically have measured compensation received by prime-aged working 
men for mortality risk.  One might expect the elderly to have a lower WTP to avoid small 
changes in risk, given their shorter life expectancy.7  In addition, job-related risks are 
typically incurred voluntarily, whereas air pollution risks are involuntary.   There is some 
evidence that individuals have higher willingness to pay for the reduction of involuntary 
risks than for reduction of risks incurred voluntarily.8  Recently, the criticisms of revealed 
preference labor market studies have led to the increased use of stated preference 
(typically contingent valuation) techniques to value mortality risk reductions.  Contingent 
valuation (CV) studies ask individuals to value a given reduction in mortality.  These 
studies might be preferred to hedonic labor market studies because they have the 
potential to appropriately characterize the mortality risk of interest.  Individuals can be 
made aware that the risk is involuntary, can be told the specific nature of the risk 
reduction, and can be tested on their understanding of the risk.  In addition, CV allows for 
the testing of hypotheses that WTP varies by individual factors, such as age or health 
status.   
                                                 
7 Krupnick et al. (2000) find that age is associated with WTP, observing a reduction in WTP for ages 70 
and above. 
8 See, for example, Violette and Chesnut (1983). Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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The ability to test for correct risk perception is an important advantage of CV 
studies over revealed preference labor market studies, which must assume correct 
perception of risk by study subjects.   When risk is perceived correctly, WTP should 
increase with the size of risk reduction, a notion that can be tested for sensitivity to 
“scope”—that is, whether the WTP is sensitive to the extent of the risk reduction. 
However, a literature review by Hammitt and Graham (1999) provides evidence that few 
CV studies of mortality risk actually pass such tests.  In Jones-Lee et al. (1985), and 
Smith and Desvouges (1987), for example, WTP does not increase at all with the size of 
risk change.  
Two recent studies explicitly attempt to match the nature of injury from PM to 
WTP for a reduction in PM exposure. Krupnick et al. (2002) and Alberini et al. (2001) 
indicate lower estimates of the VSL than are being used by EPA.  These results are 
explained by a better communication to subjects of the concepts of both probability of the 
effect among the population in the study, and the future health status of individuals, as 
compared to populations in previous studies. Interestingly, the lower estimates do not 
result from either differences in health status or age among the population. New territory 
for future studies exists in the incorporation of the effects of more abstract characteristics 
of risk, such as dread or the lack of controllability. 
2.4 Other Sources of Uncertainty 
Other sources of uncertainty that we do not examine explicitly in this paper 
include the physical and chemical transformation of NOX emissions in the atmosphere 
and its transport, the cost of the emission trading program, and the parameters in the 
electricity market equilibrium model (Haiku) that characterize restructuring.  
The physical and chemical transformations of NOX emissions in the atmosphere 
and its transport are addressed in a reduced-form version of a model called Advanced 
Source Trajectory Regional Air Pollution (ASTRAP). ASTRAP uses 11 years of wind 
and precipitation data to estimate the variability of model results on the basis of 
climatological variability. The resulting variability in ambient concentration and 
deposition estimates is then incorporated into the module to represent climatological 
variability. This variability is significant when examining the baseline or policy scenarios Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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in a stand-alone manner. However, when the policy scenario concentrations are 
subtracted from the baseline concentrations to estimate concentration reductions under 
the policies, much of the year-to-year variability due to climatological differences is 
canceled out (Bloyd et al., 1996). Hence, we do not include this source of uncertainty in 
our analysis. 
The major previous example of a large emission trading program is the SO2 
trading program initiated under the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments. One of the 
important surprises that resulted from that program was the dramatic reduction in the cost 
of emissions (compared to expectations at the time the program was introduced) and 
many have attributed the decline in cost to the flexibility and incentives associated with 
the trading program (Carlson et al. 2000). This experience suggests that such a decline in 
cost may be a characteristic of a comparably sized NOX trading program, but there is 
reason to think otherwise. A moderately sized trading program for NOX has been in place 
in 11 northeastern states since 1999, providing the same type of incentives to find ways to 
reduce costs as would the larger program in the SIP Call region, and recent trends in costs 
of compliance are reflected in our model. One other possibility is that new technologies 
that accomplish reduction of multiple pollutants at lower cost may emerge if the federal 
government implements legislation to control multiple pollutants. That policy scenario is 
outside the scope we study. 
To distinguish the effects of market structure from the effects of technical 
parameters, we decomposed the changes in emissions (Palmer et al., 2001b). The 
decomposition examined separately the effect of changes in assumptions about 
transmission growth, availability factors, heat rates, and operating and maintenance costs, 
as well as assumptions about policies to support renewable energy. Taken separately, 
none of these assumptions led to changes that were greater than 1.6% of emissions in the 
baseline. The individual parameters led to both positive and negative changes in 
emissions when considered independently, and when considered collectively they led to 
changes of 1.8%. This constitutes just 22% of the change in emissions that result from the 
change in market structure. Therefore, for this analysis we focus only on uncertainty Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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about the future structure of the market and accept implicitly the conventional wisdom of 
how technical parameters would change as a consequence. 9   
3. The Models 
This study employs the Haiku model to simulate electricity generation and 
consumption.  Changes in emissions that result from policy experiments are fed into an 
integrated assessment model of atmospheric transport and environmental effects called 
the Tracking and Analysis Framework (TAF). 
The Haiku electricity model simulates equilibrium in regional electricity markets 
and inter-regional electricity trade with an integrated algorithm for NOX emission control 
technology choice.10 The model calculates electricity demand, electricity prices, the 
composition of electricity supply, inter-regional electricity trading activity among 13 
NERC subregions, and emissions of key pollutants such as NOX, SO2 and CO2 from 
electricity generation. Three customer classes are represented (residential, industrial, and 
commercial). Detail about demand functions is provided and supply curves are calculated 
for four time periods (super-peak, peak, shoulder, and baseload hours) in each of three 
seasons (summer, winter, and spring/fall). Investment in new generation capacity and 
retirement of existing facilities are determined endogenously, based on capacity-related 
costs of providing service in the future (“going forward costs”). Generator dispatch in the 
model is based on minimization of short run variable costs of generation. 
Inter-regional power trading is identified as the level of trading necessary  to 
equilibrate regional electricity prices (accounting for transmission costs and power 
losses).  These inter-regional transactions are constrained by the assumed level of 
available inter-regional transmission capability as reported by NERC. Factor prices such 
as the cost of capital and labor are held constant. Fuel price forecasts are calibrated to 
                                                 
9 A related source of uncertainty is the assumption about future fuel prices. However, if natural gas supplies 
become limited, either due to natural availability or regulatory decisionmaking, then we would expect to 
see more coal-fired generation in both the baseline and in the policy cases we model. The result would be 
somewhat closer to the scenario involving the effects of marginal cost pricing in the electricity sector. 
10 Haiku was developed by RFF and has been used for a number of reports and articles that appear in the 
peer-reviewed literature. The model has been compared with other simulation models as part of two series 
of meetings of Stanford University’s Energy Modeling Forum.  (Energy Modeling Forum 1998, 2001). Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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match EIA price forecasts for 2000 (U.S. EIA 1999). The model includes fuel market 
modules for coal and natural gas that calculate prices that are responsive to factor 
demand. Coal is differentiated along several dimensions including fuel quality and 
location of supply, and both coal and natural gas prices are differentiated by point of 
delivery. All other fuel prices are specified exogenously, with most changing over time.  
The algorithm for compliance with NOX emissions caps in Haiku solves for the 
least cost set of post-combustion investments. The variable costs of emission controls 
plus the opportunity cost of emission allowances under cap and trade programs are added 
to the variable cost of generation in establishing the operation of generation capacity. The 
post-combustion controls that can be selected in Haiku are selective catalytic reduction 
(SCR) and selective noncatalytic reduction (SNCR). We have also tried hybrid, which 
combines SCR and SNCR, and it is never selected as a compliance option, so we 
removed it as an option to speed up the algorithm. All of the cost and emission control 
efficiency estimates for both SCR and SNCR are based on a report from Bechtel to EPA 
on NOX controls (USEPA, 1998a.) 
The changes in emissions of NOX that result from the policies are fed into the 
Tracking and Analysis Framework (TAF), a nonproprietary and peer-reviewed integrated 
assessment model (Bloyd et al., 1996).11 TAF integrates pollutant transport and 
deposition (including formation of secondary particulates but excluding ozone), visibility 
effects, effects on recreational lake fishing through changes in soil and aquatic chemistry, 
human health effects, and valuation of benefits. We assume that PM 2.5 is about 51% of 
PM10, and that PM10 is about 55% of total suspended particulates. All effects are 
evaluated at the state level and changes outside the United States are not evaluated. We 
report only health-related impacts, which are the lion’s share of quantifiable impacts 
according to previous papers (Krupnick and Burtraw 1996; Burtraw et al. 1998). 
                                                 
11 TAF was developed in support of the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP) and is 
the work of a team of more than 30 modelers and scientists from institutions around the country. Each 
module of TAF was constructed and refined by a group of experts in that field, and draws primarily on peer 
reviewed literature to construct the integrated model.  As the framework in which these literatures are 
integrated, TAF itself was subject to an extensive peer review in December 1995, which concluded that 
"TAF represent[s] a major advancement in our ability to perform integrated assessments" and that the 
model was ready for use by NAPAP (ORNL, 1995).  The entire model is available at 
www.lumina.com\taflist. Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
19 
Changes in health status are predicted to result from changes in air pollution 
concentrations. Impacts are expressed as the number of days acute morbidity effects of 
various types last, the number of chronic disease cases, and the number of statistical lives 
lost to premature death, based on C-R functions found in the peer-reviewed literature. 
The C-R functions are taken, for the most part, from epidemiological articles reviewed in 
EPA’s Criteria Documents that, in turn appear in key EPA cost-benefit analyses, such as 
the EPA Section 812 prospective and retrospective studies (USEPA, 1997a; USEPA, 
1999).  The health effects module contains C-R functions for PM10, TSP, SO2, sulfates 
(SO4), NO2, and nitrates (NO3). In this paper we examine only changes in concentrations 
resulting from changes in emissions of NOX. We ignore changes in concentrations of 
emissions of SO2 due to the cap on aggregate emissions. 
A variety of mortality concentration-response functions are available in the model 
using inputs that consist of changes in ambient concentrations of NOX, and demographic 
information on the population of interest. For morbidity, changes in NO2 and NO3 are 
modeled according to a scheme designed to avoid double counting of effects—such as 
symptom days and restricted activity days—using a variety of studies from the literature.  
NOX is included for respiratory symptom days, eye irritation days, and phlegm days. The 
change in the annual number of impacts of each health endpoint is the output that is 
valued.  
The health valuation submodule of TAF assigns monetary values taken from the 
environmental economics literature to the health effects estimates produced by the health 
effects module. The benefits are totaled to obtain annual health benefits for each year 
modeled.  
4. Scenarios 
We exercise the models to explore the three uncertainties we have identified using 
scenario analysis. While some studies evaluating uncertainties in the valuation of 
mortality effects have relied on Monte Carlo simulation using distributions derived from 
meta-analyses (Desvouges et al. 1998), we find the evaluation of 18 unique scenarios 
most suitable to our purposes. First, it allows us to display results from a range of 
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studies.  Second, the goal of this study is not the arrival at a confidence interval for 
benefits based on the available literature, but rather the direct comparison of estimates 
from a number of scenarios on either side of our “preferred” estimates used in earlier 
research (Burtraw et al. 2001; Palmer et al. 2001a).  In particular, we want to observe 
whether or not the earlier result that an annual policy in the SIP region is preferable to a 
seasonal policy proves robust over this range of scenarios.  Additionally, examining a 
range of scenarios allows us to gauge under which, if any, assumptions a national annual 
policy might warrant consideration.  In this section we describe two scenarios that are 
developed to represent the structure of the electricity market, three scenarios to represent 
epidemiology and three to represent valuation of health effects. Finally, we describe the 
three policy scenarios that are investigated within this modeling domain.  
4.1 Structure of Electricity Market 
Because several regions have already restructured their electricity markets, we 
develop a limited restructuring scenario by assuming that marginal-cost pricing of 
electricity is implemented in those regions and subregions of the North American Electric 
Reliability Council (NERC) where most of the population resides in states that have 
already made a commitment to implement restructuring.12 All other regions are assumed 
to price electricity at average cost. The alternative economic regulatory scenario labeled 
“nationwide restructuring” assumes that restructuring is implemented across the country 
by 2008. We characterize the limited restructuring scenario as a “low” case because there 
exist lower emissions in the absence of the NOX policies. The nationwide scenario is 
characterized as a “high” case and entails emissions that are about 567,000 tons (10%) 
greater.  
The features that distinguish the scenarios are shown in Table 1. Previous analysis 
indicates the method of determining price is the most important of these to emissions, 
electricity price, and demand.  In regulated regions the price of generation is based on the 
average cost of generating electricity, and in competitive regions the price of generation 
is based on the marginal cost of generating electricity. Another way that prices differ 
                                                 
12 The states that are assumed to employ competitive pricing in the limited restructuring scenario are 
California, Texas, and New York, plus the mid-Atlantic and New England states. Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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between regulated and competitive regions is the pricing of reserve services. In regulated 
regions, the fixed costs of the units providing reserve services are included in the measure 
of total cost of service, which is used to calculate  average costs of generation. In 
competitive regions, a linked market to provide reserve services is solved. To maintain 
incentive compatibility between the generation and reserve markets, the reserve payment 
is made to all generators providing generation or reserve services.  
Table 1 Characterization of economic regulation and distinguishing features in 2008. 
Also, we assume that the use of time-varying prices of electricity will become 
more widespread as a result of restructuring. We represent this assumption by assigning 
time of use prices to industrial customers in any region that has implemented marginal 
cost pricing. In regulated regions and for residential and commercial customers in all 
regions, the retail price is assumed to be steady between peak and off-peak times, but can 
vary across seasons.  
The treatment of stranded costs is another characteristic of the nationwide 
restructuring scenario. Stranded cost refers to the depreciation in the market value of 
generation assets to a point below book value as a result of the move to a competitive 
Characterization Low  (Preferred) High 
  Extent of Competition 
 Limited  Nationwide 
Pricing Institution  Mix of Regulation 
and Competition 
Competition 
Stranded Costs  n/a  Recovery of 90% 
Renewables Portfolio Standard None  Renewable  Portfolio 
Standard  
Transmission Capability  No change  10% Expansion 
Ratio of Technical Parameter Values 2008 to 1997 
Maximum Availability Factor  1.02  1.04 
Heat Rate  0.99  0.97 
General and Administrative Cost  0.75  0.67 
Nonfuel O&M Cost  0.76  0.70 
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market. We assume that 90% of the difference is recovered as part of a transition fee. The 
Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) refers to the adoption of a policy to require a 
percentage of the electricity sold to customers be generated using a renewables-based 
technology. A number of states have already adopted similar policies. We assume there 
exists a $17 per megawatt-hour (MWh) price cap on tradable renewable credits. Also, 
transmission capability is assumed to remain constant under limited restructuring but to 
grow under nationwide restructuring. 
The remainder of the variables in the table describe the assumed rates of technical 
improvement in the fleet of existing generation stations. Productivity change is 
implemented in the model through changes in four parameters: improvements in the 
maximum capacity factor at existing generators, reductions in the heat rate at existing 
coal-fired generators, reductions in operating costs, and reductions in general and 
administrative costs at all existing generators. Table 1 illustrates the ratio of each variable 
under each scenario in 2008 and compares it to its value in 1997. All of the assumptions 
are identical to those set forth for both market structures in Palmer et al. (2001a) and are 
based on assumptions developed by the collection of energy modelers who participated in 
Stanford University’s Energy Modeling Forum Working Group 17 (Energy Modeling 
Forum 2001).13 
4.2 Epidemiology 
In accordance with the majority of existing epidemiological literature, we assume 
a linear concentration response function in all scenarios. We treat nitrates as similar in 
potency to ordinary PM10.  Thus the C-R coefficients used are from studies estimating 
the statistical relationship between particulate matter concentrations and mortality rates. 
The range of C-R coefficient assumptions used in this analysis is presented in Table 2.  
                                                 
13 Burtraw et al. (2001) and Palmer et al. (2001a) employ assumptions that are more optimistic than the 
Energy Modeling Forum study about how restructuring is likely to improve availability factors and slightly 
less optimistic about how far general and administrative costs are likely to fall as a result of restructuring. Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
23 
Table 2.  Characterization of epidemiology and concentration-response coefficients. 
 
Our low assumption is drawn from Samet et al. (2000), a time-series analysis of 
PM10 effects on mortality from 1987-1994, which is part of the National Morbidity, 
Mortality, and Air Pollution Study. The study makes a significant contribution to the 
literature by using a single analytic approach to analyze the effect of PM10 in a large 
number of locations, and for its evaluation of differences at the regional level.  For the 
purposes of this analysis, however, we use the 90-city aggregate estimate. This estimate 
indicates that one can expect to find a 0.46% increase in the mortality rate for an increase 
of 10 µg/m
3 increase in PM10.  
For our central C-R estimate, we employ the mortality relationship from Schwartz 
and Dockery (1992), another time series study of acute mortality. This is the coefficient 
that was used in earlier papers examining the relative cost-effectiveness of NOx policies 
(Burtraw et al., 2001; Palmer et al., 2001a).  Schwartz and Dockery is a time-series 
analysis of TSP mortality effects in Steubenville, OH, during the years 1974-1984. The 
estimated C-R relationship for PM10 is a 1.0% increase in the mortality rate per 10 µg/m
3 
increase in PM10. 
Our high C-R coefficient assumption is drawn from Pope et al. (1995), a study of 
chronic mortality effects of PM 2.5. A reanalysis of the original study was performed by 
 Low  Mid  (Preferred)  High 
Study  Samet et al. 
(2000) 
Schwartz and 
Dockery (1992)  Pope et al. (1995) 
Mortality Type  Acute  Acute  Chronic 
Time Period  1987-1994  1974-1984  1982-1989 
Particle Size   PM10  TSP  PM2.5 
Population  All ages,  





years of age, 
 50 U.S cities 
C-R coefficient for PM10 
(% ∆ mortality per 10 µg/m
3 )  0.46  1.0  3.57 
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Krewski et al. (2000), essentially replicating the original results, and finding them robust 
to a number of alternative specifications. However, rather than incorporate the coefficient 
from the reanalysis, we use the original concentration-response relationship from Pope et 
al. (1995), a 3.57% increase in the mortality rate per 10 µg/m
3 increase in PM10, as it has 
been the basis for numerous analyses, most notably the EPA Retrospective and 
Prospective studies (U.S. EPA 1997a; U.S. EPA 1999).  Because the Pope et al. (1995) 
study population is limited to individuals aged 30 years or older, we limit the application 
of this C-R coefficient to individuals of the same age range. 
4.3 Valuation 
To characterize the interesting range of possible values of changes in the risk of 
premature mortality (VSL) we again use three scenarios. These alternatives are 
summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3  Characterization of mortality valuation. 
The low VSL assumption is from Mrozek and Taylor (2002).  This study is a 
meta-analysis of 33 studies of compensating wage differentials that reported a combined 
total of 203 VSL estimates.  For populations facing mortality risks approximately equal 
to the average risk of accidental death in the workplace, they find a mean VSL of $2.16 
million (1997 dollars).14 Mrozek and Taylor suggest that wage-risk studies are likely to 
                                                 
14 This estimate restricts the sample to U.S data sources and Bureau of Labor Statistics risk data, omits 
high-risk analyses (mean risk greater than 5/10,000), and controls for interindustry wage differentials. 
 Low  Mid  (Preferred)  High 
Study  Mrozek and 
Taylor (2000) 
Chestnut et al. 






average based on 
a combination of 
wage-risk and CV 
studies 
Estimate derived 
from combination of 
21 wage-risk and 5 
CV studies 
Mean VSL  
(millions 1997 dollars)  $2.17 $3.84  $5.90 
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overestimate the value of risk-reduction as a result of falsely attributing wage rate 
differentials to risk that are actually due to inter-industry differences in wage-rates. This 
seemingly low estimate is comparable to recent estimates in the valuation literature from 
studies that attempt to more closely link WTP with the specific nature of injury that 
results from changes in air pollution (Krupnick et al, 2002 and Alberini et al, 2001).   
The central assumption for VSL is Chestnut et al. (1995), which estimates a mean 
VSL of $3.84 million (1997 dollars).  This assumption is used in Burtraw et al. (2001), 
though in that paper the authors chose not to update the value for inflation as an 
interpretation of the recent trends in the literature discussed above. Here, however, we 
have adjusted the VSL to account for inflation. Chestnut and coauthors choose a low, 
central, and high VSL and assign probability weights to each, based largely on the extent 
to which the existing literature supports the value in order to achieve their benefits 
estimate. 
The high estimate is from EPA (1999).  This analysis pooled 26 value of life 
studies (five contingent valuation, 21 wage-risk) to derive a Weibull distribution with a 
mean of $5.9 million (1997 dollars) and a standard deviation of $3.99 million.  The EPA 
uses this VSL in its Section 812 Retrospective and Prospective studies (U.S. EPA, 1997a; 
U.S. EPA, 1999), and it falls well within the acceptable range of VSL estimates. 
However, three criticisms of earlier VSL studies, particularly wage-risk studies, can be 
extended to EPA’s estimate and support its characterization as a high assumption.  First, 
EPA’s chosen value is drawn primarily from studies of prime-age working males who 
face small risks of workplace mortality.  Second, given the suggestion of Mrozek and 
Taylor (2002) that VSL estimates from wage-risk studies exceeding $2 million to 3 
million ($1998) are likely to suffer from inadequate control of inter-industry wage 
differentials, and EPA’s derivation of a VSL from numerous studies falling into this 
category, it seems plausible that EPA’s chosen value is biased upward. Finally, it does 
not reflect recent innovations in study designs, discussed above, that seem to be 
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4.4 Policies 
The uncertain variables are collected in 18 combinations (2x3x3), and each is 
examined under a baseline and three NOX policies. The baseline NOX policy scenario 
includes the NOX trading program (known as “Phase II”) in the northeastern ozone 
transport region (OTR) but excludes new policies to reduce NOX in the multi-state SIP 
Call region. There is a separate baseline for each market structure (limited restructuring 
and nationwide restructuring). All changes in emissions, benefits, and costs stemming 
from NOX policies are measured relative to the respective baseline for a given market 
structure.15  
The NOX policy scenario labeled SIP Seasonal corresponds to EPA’s proposed 
program described previously as the NOX SIP Call. This scenario includes a five-month 
summer ozone program implemented in the eastern United States that is represented by 
the regions in our model that are approximately equal to the SIP Call region.16 The 
emissions cap under this policy is 444,300 tons per five-month summer season within the 
SIP Call region in year 2008. This compares with an emission level of 1.465 million tons 
in the baseline NOX scenario under limited restructuring and 1.625 million tons in the 
baseline NOX scenario under nationwide restructuring. This emission cap was determined 
by applying the emissions rate of 0.15 lb per MMBtu to fossil-fired generation in 1997, 
and hence the emission cap under the policy does not vary according to assumption about 
market structure. 17 
                                                 
15 In the baseline we assume 82% of coal-fired units have low NOX burners, including wall-fired units 
(70% of coal-fired capacity) and tangentially-fired units (12%). In addition, we assume tangentially-fired 
units have over-fire air. 
16 These regions include NE (New England); MAAC (Maryland, District of Columbia, Delaware, and New 
Jersey; most of Pennsylvania); New York; STV (Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and North 
Carolina; parts of Virginia, Mississippi, Kentucky, and Florida); ECAR (Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, and 
West Virginia; parts of Kentucky, Virginia, and Pennsylvania); and MAIN (most of Illinois and Wisconsin; 
part of Missouri). These regions exclude a small portion of western Missouri that is part of the 19 states 
covered by the SIP Call, and small parts of Illinois and Wisconsin. These regions include the eastern half of 
Mississippi, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine, which are not part of the SIP Call region. However, the 
other New England states—Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island—are part of the eastern region 
covered by the OTR. The reconciliation of these two programs may ultimately involve their participation. 
17 This is the same methodology applied by EPA. Forecast electricity generation varies slightly in our 
model, and the geographic coverage varies slightly, from the EPA model (U.S. EPA 1998a, 1998b, 1999).  Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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The second NOX policy scenario is SIP Annual. Here, the average emissions rate 
achieved during the five-month summer season for the SIP Call region is extended to an 
annual basis. The annual emissions cap under this policy is 1.06 million tons per year 
within the SIP region in year 2008. This compares with an emission level of 3.449 
million tons in the baseline NOX scenario under limited restructuring and 3.866 in the 
baseline NOX scenario under nationwide restructuring. 
The third NOX policy scenario is National Annual. In this scenario the average 
emission rate for the SIP Call region is applied to the entire nation on an annual basis. 
The annual emissions cap for the nation under this policy is 1.6 million tons per year. 
This compares with an emission level of 5.533 million tons in the baseline NOX scenario 
under limited restructuring and 6.1 million tons in the baseline NOX scenario under 
nationwide restructuring. 
In both of the alternative NOX policy scenarios, we assume the policy is 
announced in 2001 and implemented in 2004. We report results for 2008, hoping thereby 
to avoid transitional difficulties in implementing the policy that may characterize the first 
years of the program (NERC 2000). 
5. Results 
Our motivation is to investigate the relative cost-effectiveness of options, given 
that a policy to address ozone will be implemented. Hence, the results are oriented to 
present the cost-effectiveness of the options relative to the currently planned SIP 
Seasonal policy. In presenting these results, we are also able to comment on the role of 
benefits and costs that we do not consider in the cost-effectiveness analyses, and to the 
desirability of the current policy proposal compared to no policy at all. Also, we achieve 
insights into the value of additional information about omitted benefits. 
5.1 Emissions  
Since the SIP seasonal program is aimed at reducing the summer-time ground-
level ozone concentration, one of the primary concerns while extending the program to an 
annual one is the increase in the SIP regional summer NOX emissions. Table 4 indicates 
that the regional summer NOX emissions in the SIP region in 2008 are below the seasonal Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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cap off 444,300 tons under both the SIP annual and the national annual policies.18  
Furthermore, the national annual policy does not lead to an increase in emissions in the 
SIP region compared to the SIP annual policy. These results are valid under both 
restructuring scenarios. 
Table 4  NOX emissions: national and SIP regional; summer and annual in 2008. 
In general, the NOX emissions are higher under nationwide restructuring as 
compared with limited restructuring for all three NOX policies, except where they are 
capped under the national annual policy. This is primarily due to the increased utilization 
of existing coal plants that occurs due to the faster improvements in the efficiency and the 
costs associated with them, as indicated in Table 1.  
                                                 
18 Variations under the cap are due to projected over-complinace in 2008 and to approximation in 
convergence in the simulation model. 
  Summer NOX Emissions 
(thousand tons) 
Annual NOX Emissions  
(thousand tons) 
 SIP  Non-SIP National  SIP Non-SIP  National   
Limited 
Restructuring 
          
Baseline 1,445  932  2,377  3,449  2,084  5,533 
SIP Seasonal  421  955  1,376  2,418  2,123  4,541 
SIP Annual   441  941  1,382  1,041  2,114  3,155 
National Annual  395  285  679  921  650  1,571 
Nationwide 
Restructuring 
          
Baseline 1,625  985  2,610  3,866  2,234  6,100 
SIP Seasonal  437  1,001  1,438  2,672  2,238  4,910 
SIP Annual   444  976  1,420  1,048  2,219  3,267 
National Annual  400  288  688  942  652  1,594 
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5.2 Costs 
NOX emissions from power plants can be reduced by: (1) installation of post-
combustion controls; (2) input substitution—for example, substituting gas generation for 
coal generation; or (3) reduction in total generation. We find the installation of post-
combustion controls accounts for the vast majority of emission reductions under all 
scenarios and policies, but the choice of which type of control and the contribution of 
other ways to reduce emissions varies.19  
Under all of the policies, well over 95% of coal-fired power plants are retrofitted 
with post combustion controls. Under the policies targeting just the SIP region, about 210 
gigawatts (GW) of generation is retrofitted with post-combustion controls under each 
market structure scenario.  
The second column of Table 5 reports that the SIP Seasonal policy induces 68% 
of the controls to be SCR under limited restructuring, and 80% to be SCR under 
nationwide restructuring. The remaining portion is controlled with SNCR. When the SIP 
Seasonal policy is extended to the SIP Annual or the National Annual level the percent of 
capacity that is controlled with SCR grows substantially. This happens because SCR is 
relatively more capital intensive than SNCR. Under an annual policy, the controls will 
operate over more kWh per year, which means the average cost of emission reductions is 
less than under a seasonal policy. The percent of compliance costs that are capital costs 
are reported in Table 5. The greatest percent occurs under the SIP Seasonal policy, 
because the controls operate over the fewest kWh under a seasonal policy.  
                                                 
19 Palmer et al. (2001) report that a welfare measure of cost, in terms of changes in consumer and producer 
surplus within the electricity sector, yields somewhat lower values than the resource cost of post-
combustion control because, typically, electricity is not priced efficiently, and often marginal cost is greater 
than electricity price. We find the change in surplus is somewhat less than the resource cost in the cases 
they study, ranging from 82% of compliance cost in the case of the SIP Seasonal policy under limited 
restructuring to 98% of compliance cost in the case of the SIP Annual policy under nationwide 
restructuring. However, under the National Annual policy, the difference is more substantial. In the case of 
limited restructuring, the welfare cost is just 39% of compliance cost, because outside the SIP Call region 
most of the nation has regulated prices. In the case of nationwide restructuring the situation is reversed and 
the change in economic surplus is 127% of compliance cost. We do not include welfare effects in this 
analysis because it is a significant departure from the measure of resource costs that forms the basis for 
most of the policy and economic debate (U.S. EIA, 2001).  However, future research should consider such 
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Under the National Annual policy we find that virtually all of the coal-fired plants 
that can install post-combustion controls have installed them, with the majority selecting 
SCR. However, this is not sufficient to achieve the required emission reductions. The 
need for further emission reductions leads to increasingly expensive installations at a 
small number of oil-fired or gas-fired facilities, which pushes up the marginal cost of 
compliance and creates a larger role for other ways to reduce emissions. 
Table 5.  Capacity that installs post-combustion controls, type of controls, and total and 
marginal control costs in 2008 by market structure. 
Substitution of gas for coal plays a somewhat more important role in reducing 
emissions under the National Annual policy with nationwide restructuring. In this case, 
coal-fired generation is 6.4% less than in the baseline and gas-fired generation is 9.6% 
greater. In other cases we see small variation in the amount of coal and gas generation. 



















          
Baseline  11.4 0.0  47.6  6.0  46.4 30 
SIP Seasonal  213.0 67.7  8.0  38.5  53.6  2,176 
SIP Annual   211.4 80.2 15.7 35.9  48.4  2,758 
National 
Annual 
333.5 92.3 12.8 37.5  49.8  4,464 
Nationwide 
Restructuring 
          
Baseline  12.4 0.0  47.6  6.0  46.4 33 
SIP Seasonal  208.7 80.5  7.5  39.5  53.0  2,486 
SIP Annual   204.6 90.7 14.8 36.8  48.4  2,899 
National 
Annual 
332.3 94.9 13.2 37.3  49.5  4,531 
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The third way to achieve emission reductions is to reduce electricity consumption 
and total generation. Under both restructuring scenarios, the policies targeting the SIP 
region yield almost no change in total generation from baseline quantities. Only the 
National Annual policy produces noticeable reductions in total generation. Under the 
limited restructuring scenario the reduction is 2%; under the nationwide restructuring 
scenario the reduction is 1%. 
The small change in total generation is related to the small effect that the NOX 
policies have on electricity price. National electricity price falls slightly under the SIP 
Seasonal policy compared to baseline with limited restructuring, as indicated in the right 
column of Table 6. The price falls due to the small changes in gas-fired generation in 
some regions, which determines marginal generation cost and price in competitive 
regions, and small changes in electricity transmission. As a consequence, the bulk of the 
resource cost of post-combustion controls are borne by producers in this case. Under the 
nationwide restructuring scenario there is substantially greater use of coal for electricity 
generation in the baseline. Consequently, the introduction of the SIP Seasonal policy 
under nationwide restructuring imposes relatively greater opportunity cost by requiring a 
greater quantity of emission reductions through abatement or through reducing coal-fired 
generation, and this is reflected in the change in electricity price.  
Under both restructuring scenarios the increase in electricity price due to the SIP 
Annual policy is almost zero, even though the total cost of pollution control goes up by 
around $500 million (1997 dollars) compared to the SIP Seasonal policy. The reason is 
that it is more cost-effective to install SCR than SNCR when the amount of emissions 
reductions required are greater, as noted previously. Marginal compliance costs fall, 
compared to the SIP Seasonal policy, resulting in lower NOX permit prices that offset the 
increased cost of post-combustion control. 
The increase in price under the National Annual policy is small under the limited 
restructuring scenario. This follows from the regulation of electricity price in much of the 
nation that is brought into compliance under the national emission cap. Under regulation, 
price adjusts sufficiently to cover the change in total cost. However, under nationwide 
restructuring, the National Annual policy is determined by marginal generation cost and Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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the effect is more variable, depending on the characteristics of generation capacity and 
costs. 
Table 6.  Characteristics of electricity generation in 2008 by market structure.  
 
5.3 Benefits 
Benefits from particulate-related changes in human morbidity and mortality are 
calculated under each scenario. For convenience we repeat that our preferred set of 
assumptions are limited restructuring, Schwartz and Dockery (1992) C-R coefficient, and 
Chestnut et al. (1995) VSL. Under preferred assumptions, morbidity effects account for 
between $199 million and $698 million (1997 dollars) over the three policy scenarios, or 
about 21% of total health benefits. Mortality effects account for $726 million to $2,452 
million (1997 dollars) over the three policies, which is the remaining portion of benefits 
we estimate. The relatively small contribution from morbidity to total health benefits is 
consistent with the current literature and our decision to focus on uncertainty specific to 
  Generation (million MWh) 






    
Baseline 1,767  1,182  3,996 62.2 
SIP Seasonal  1,759  1,221  3,997  62.0 
SIP Annual   1,784  1,203  4,010  62.1 
National 
Annual 
1,755 1,135 3,917  62.5 
Nationwide 
Restructuring 
    
Baseline 1,997 941 4,032 60.1 
SIP Seasonal  1,972  961  4,020  60.7 
SIP Annual   1,971  962  4,019  60.9 
National 
Annual 
1,870 1,031 3,991  62.1 
 Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
33 
mortality benefits. Because we do not examine uncertainties in morbidity effects, 
morbidity benefits change only with changes in emissions implicit in the different policy 
scenarios.  Over the entire range of scenarios, therefore, morbidity benefits vary by a 
relatively narrow range, from $199 million to $763 million (1997 dollars).  
In contrast, mortality benefits vary substantially over the chosen range of 
epidemiology and valuation uncertainties. Mortality benefits range from $191 million to 
$9,115 million (1997 dollars) among the scenarios. This constitutes a range of 49% 
(under the scenario yielding the lowest benefits, mortality benefits are actually slightly 
lower than morbidity benefits) to 92% of total benefits, which range from $390 million to 
$9,878 million (1997 dollars). 
5.4 Net Benefits and Cost-Effectiveness 
The basis for the evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of the policies is benefits 
minus costs, or net benefits. Although in many cases we find negative net benefits, one 
can infer little from this because potentially important benefits and costs are excluded 
from the analysis. In these cases, one would have to consider omitted benefits in order to 
argue that total benefits may exceed total costs. Nonetheless, the estimate of partial net 
benefits based solely on particulate-related health benefits provides robust conclusions 
about the relative cost-effectiveness of the policies in many of the scenarios examined. 
By comparing the value of partial net benefits of the different policies, we can show that 
net benefits would increase, often substantially, through the choice of a more cost-
effective policy. The value of net benefits for each policy under each scenario is reported 
in Table 7.  We discuss net benefits from both a national and regional perspective. 
5.4.1 The National Perspective 
The main finding is that under each of the 18 uncertainty scenarios we consider, 
the net benefits under a SIP Annual policy are at least as great as those expected under 
the EPA’s currently planned policy to implement a seasonal cap. The preferred 
(midpoint) assumptions lead to additional net benefits of $724 million per year under an 
annual policy compared to a seasonal one, but among all the scenarios additional net 
benefits of an annual policy range from $0 up to $3 billion per year (1997 dollars).  Resources for the Future      Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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Table 7: Net benefits in 2008 (million 1997 dollars). Preferred scenario is shaded. 
Epidemiology: Low  Mid  High 
Valuation: Low  Mid  High  Low  Mid High  Low Mid High 
Baseline Emissions: Low 
(Limited Restructuring)             
SIP  Seasonal -1,756 -1,612 -1,460  -1,534 -1,220  -846 -1,060  -383  440 
SIP  Annual -1,793 -1,454 -1,090  -1,268  -496  407 -136  1,554  3,484 
National  Annual -3,092 -2,612 -2,083  -2,334 -1,294  64 -729  1,562  4,508 
Baseline Emissions: High 
(Nationwide Restructuring)             
SIP  Seasonal -2,004 -1,841 -1,654  -1,750 -1,383  -958  -1,197  -415  550 
SIP  Annual -1,806 -1,415 -1,008  -1,203  -354  692  92  1,932  4,291 
National  Annual -3,007 -2,463 -1,881  -2,179  -978  478  -370  2,177  5,377 
 
Key:  Market Structure and Baseline Emissions: Low (Limited Restructuring), High (Nationwide Restructuring) 
Epidemiology (C-R): Low (Samet et al. 2000), Mid (Schwartz and Dockery 1992), High (Pope et al. 1995) 
Valuation (VSL): Low (Mrozek and Taylor, 2000), Mid (Chestnut et al. 1995), High (EPA, 1999). 
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The greatest variation in net benefits results from the range of epidemiological 
assumptions that we investigate, though the variation attributable to the range of 
valuation scenarios also is large. In contrast, the choice of market structure plays a 
relatively small role in the variation in the calculation of net benefits. Under nationwide 
restructuring, all of the policies tend to yield systematically higher net benefits than under 
limited restructuring. The relative cost-effectiveness of the policies is not very sensitive 
to this the restructuring scenario, although it may be important to a benefit-cost analysis. 
A graphic comparison of the net benefits for the nation of the three policies under 
all the scenarios is presented in Figure 2. The net benefits for the SIP Seasonal policy are 
presented as monotonically increasing in the figure. For every scenario, the comparable 
net benefits of the SIP Annual policy lie above those for the SIP Seasonal. The National 
Annual benefits are above those of the SIP Seasonal in half of the scenarios.  
We reason that consideration of omitted benefits, such as reduced nitrogen 
deposition and ozone, would strengthen the finding that an annual policy in the SIP Call 
region is more cost-effective than a seasonal policy. Benefits from omitted effects would 
always accrue to the national policy in at least as great a measure as they would accrue to 
the seasonal policy. The benefits of reduced nitrogen deposition would accrue 
substantially in the winter months under the annual policy. Hence, the inclusion of 
omitted benefits would not change the results. We find there is sufficient information to 
conclude that an annual policy is preferable to a seasonal policy in the SIP Call region.  
In contrast, a second main finding is that a greater understanding of the benefit 
pathways that are excluded from the analysis is important to obtaining an ordinal ranking 
of the cost-effectiveness of the National Annual policy compared to the other policies. 
Under preferred values for uncertain parameters, the current SIP Seasonal policy is 
preferable by a small amount compared to a National Annual policy. But, Figure 2 
illustrates that, in half of the scenarios we examine, the National Annual policy is more 
cost-effective. We reason the relative performance of the National Annual policy 
compared to the SIP Seasonal policy could only be strengthened by consideration of 
omitted benefits. Similarly, a comparison of the National Annual policy with the SIP 
Annual policy is not robust to the inclusion of omitted benefits because benefits that Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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accrue outside the SIP region would augment only the net benefits of the National Annual 
policy. 
Figure 2: Net benefits for the nation, 2008. 
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5.4.2 The Regional Perspective 
A regional perspective on the expected net benefits is relevant, given the 
regulatory setting for the policies we consider. Even if the EPA was supportive of an 
annual policy, it could not impose one as part of the SIP Call because it is justified on the 
basis of controlling ozone, which is a seasonal problem. The EPA lacks authority to 
mandate annual reductions in NOX until particulate-related legislation, such as the PM2.5 
standard or the regional haze standard, becomes a reality, which in any event would be 
years in the future. It is incumbent on state pollution officers to decide how to implement 
the SIP Call emission reduction requirements, and they could choose to adopt an annual 
program. 
Therefore, we are interested in investigating the incentives at the regional level to 
implement emission reductions. Figure 3 illustrates the net benefits that are achieved in 
the SIP region under the policies, excluding benefits that accrue to the rest of the nation. 
Since all of the costs of policies in the SIP region accrue within the region, but a fraction 
of the benefits spill over to states outside the region, net benefits within the SIP region 
under policies exclusive to the region are less than net benefits to the nation as a whole.   
This result holds for either SIP-exclusive policy, though a greater amount of benefits spill 
over under the SIP Annual policy than under the SIP Seasonal policy. From the 
perspective of the SIP region, the SIP Annual policy is more cost-effective than the SIP 
Seasonal policy under all scenarios.  Over the 18 scenarios examined, net benefits are 
between $77 million and $2,761 million greater under the SIP Annual policy compared to 
the SIP Seasonal policy.  
However, there is a substantial difference when evaluating the net benefits of the 
National Annual policy from a regional perspective. An important part of the costs under 
the National Annual policy accrue outside the SIP region, and some of the benefits from 
emission reductions outside the region spill over into the SIP region. Therefore, the 
picture of net benefits in the SIP region under the National Annual policy is substantially 
improved. Figure 3 illustrates that, from the perspective of the SIP region, a National 
Annual policy such as might be embodied in proposed legislation would be more cost-
effective than either an annual or a seasonal policy in the SIP region. This result is robust 
across all of the uncertainty scenarios. Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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There is another important distinction to be made between the 11 northeastern 
states known as the OTR that have been participating in a summertime NOX trading 
program since 1999, and the remainder of the states in the SIP region that have been less 
receptive to the requirements of the SIP Call. The remaining states outside the OTR 
represent the lion’s share of emissions in the region and therefore they will bear the lion’s 
share of the costs of emission reductions. In addition, since emissions are thought to drift 
prevalently from the west toward the northeast, it is likely that the northeastern states 
capture most of the benefits. Therefore, it is interesting to observe whether the net 
benefits accrue largely to the 11 northeastern states to the exclusion of the other eight 
states. In order to gain insight into this question, one can compare Figure 4, which 
includes just the eight states outside the OTR, with Figure 3, which includes the entire 
SIP region. 
Figure 4 illustrates there is less incentive for the states outside the northeast to 
embrace the SIP Annual policy in place of the SIP Seasonal policy than there is in the 
northeastern states.  For the SIP seasonal policy in non-OTR states, net benefits range 
from -$2,126 to -$541 million over the 18 scenarios.  For the SIP Annual policy, the 
range is from -$2,118 to $1,531 million. In roughly half of the scenarios there is little 
difference between the policies from the perspective of these states, but in the other half 
of the scenarios there are significantly greater net benefits under the SIP Annual policy in 
the non-OTR states. Our preferred assumptions fall into the latter category, with net 
benefits under the SIP Annual policy about $300 million greater compared to the SIP 
Seasonal policy.  In no scenario are net benefits substantially less under the SIP Annual 
policy. Therefore, although enthusiasm for embracing an annual policy in the SIP region 
may be somewhat muted in the states outside the northeast, there is no scenario under 
which it is a losing proposition for these states in comparison to the SIP Seasonal policy. 
Again, we note that consideration of omitted benefits—such as reduced nitrogen 
deposition and ozone in the sub-region—would strengthen the measure of the annual 
policy in the SIP Call region relative to a seasonal policy. Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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Figure 4: Net benefits in the eight states in the SIP region that are not part of the 
northeastern Ozone Transport Region, 2008. 
 
Figure 5: Net benefits outside the SIP region, 2008. 
Modest net benefits accrue to states outside the SIP region under the SIP Annual 
and the SIP Seasonal policies, as illustrated in Figure 5. Under SIP Seasonal, net benefits 
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benefits to these states are between $62 million and $570 million. However, the National 
Annual policy generally leads to fewer net benefits because of the significant costs the 
policy imposes on this portion of the country, as well as the low population density in this 
region relative to the SIP region, which implies fewer health benefits. In all but two 
scenarios, the area outside the SIP region does not achieve net benefits under the National 
Annual policy that approximate those that are achieved under the SIP Seasonal policy. 
Again, we find that a better understanding of benefits omitted from the analysis would be 
important to justifying the desirability of the National Annual policy from a western 
perspective.  
5.5 Omitted Benefits 
This analysis provides only a partial accounting of benefits and costs, which is not 
sufficient to address the wisdom of the currently proposed policy. Nonetheless, based on 
this partial accounting, one can infer the magnitude of the omitted benefits that would be 
necessary for any of the policies to yield benefits in excess of costs.  
Under our preferred scenario, omitted benefits would need to be worth about $1.2 
billion per year for net benefits to be positive under the SIP Seasonal policy. This 
translates into $1,200 per ton of NOX reduced during the summer ozone season. Under 
the SIP Annual policy, omitted benefits would need to be worth about $500 million to 
achieve positive net benefits. If all of the omitted benefits were related to ozone and were 
to accrue just during the five-month summer ozone season (thereby ignoring the effects 
of nitrogen deposition which occurs over the entire year) then the omitted benefits under 
the SIP Annual policy would need to be worth about $500 per ton to achieve positive net 
benefits. Under a National Annual policy, omitted benefits would need to total about $1.3 
billion, or about $800 per ton if they were to accrue just during the summer ozone season. Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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Table 8: Benefits and costs of NOX reductions in the literature. 
Benefits Costs Comments  (1997 dollars  
per ton NOX) 
PM Ozone    
Policies:       
SIP  Seasonal 379-2,606   2,064-2,163  Sources in SIP Region and 
health benefits throughout US 
SIP Annual  375-2,612    1,013-1,147  Sources in SIP Region and 
health benefits throughout US 
National Annual  332-2,257    999-1,119  Sources and health benefits 
throughout US  
Previous Studies:       
Burtraw et al. 
(1998) 
739     Sources and benefits 
throughout US 
Banzhaf et al. 
(1996) 
35-366 29-358    Benefits in parts of Minnesota, 
Wisconsin only 
Rowe et al. 
(1996) 
1,071-1,140   Sources in NY State; benefits 
throughout US and combine 
PM and ozone 
Krupnick et al. 
(2000) 
 167  1,032  Sources and benefits in subset 
of SIP Region; average cost 
includes reductions over 
twelve months 
USEPA (1998b)      1,807 
 
Sources in SIP region; lower 
Baseline emissions 





  Only nitrogen deposition for 
PM, only agriculture and 
forestry for ozone 
 1,011-2,801  359-2,406    Sum of health and other 
benefits 
 
Table 8 reports the range of net benefits that we identify for the policies, 
measured in dollars per ton of NOX emissions reduced, and it provides a glimpse of the 
possible magnitude of the omitted benefits based on a comparison of our results with 
previous studies. The most comprehensive of these (U.S. EPA, 1998c) finds a range for Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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ozone-related benefits that is somewhat less but roughly comparable to the range for 
particulate-related benefits, reaching from $359 to $2,406 per ton. The higher number 
would result if a link between ozone and premature mortality were established, analogous 
to the well-established link with respect to particulates. If ozone benefits fall toward the 
middle of this range, then the SIP Seasonal policy would achieve net benefits that were 
approximately positive. However, the SIP Annual policy would yield sizable positive net 
benefits under this circumstance, and it would likely yield positive net benefits even if 
ozone benefits fell toward the lower end of its range. A National Annual policy also 
could yield substantial net benefits compared to the SIP Seasonal policy.  
We note again that the omitted benefits would not alter the relative cost-
effectiveness of the SIP Annual policy compared to the SIP Seasonal policy. Without the 
inclusion of these benefits, the SIP Annual policy appears more cost-effective under 
every scenario. Inclusion of these benefits only strengthens this result.  Additional 
summertime benefits would be realized under both policies, and additional wintertime 
benefits would be realized only under the annual policy. Hence, the standing of the SIP 
Annual policy can only be strengthened through the inclusion of omitted benefits. 
However, the cost-effectiveness of the National Annual policy relative to the 
other policies could be affected by consideration of omitted benefits, because its relative 
standing varies across the scenarios we examine. Benefits that accrue in the wintertime 
would boost the cost-effectiveness of the policy relative to the SIP Seasonal policy. Also, 
the inclusion of ozone-related benefits may boost the policy relative to the SIP Annual 
policy, because in many western states ozone benefits may accrue during winter months. 
And of course, the magnitude of omitted benefits may vary significantly with the 
geography and demography of different regions. 
6. Conclusion 
The next large policy to reduce air pollution in the United States is likely to be the 
implementation of a regional and seasonal cap and trade program for NOX known as the 
NOX SIP Call trading program, which is expected to take form in 2004. This paper 
identifies three major categories of uncertainty about the benefits and costs of such a 
policy. One source of uncertainty is the future structure of the electricity market. A Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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second is the epidemiological relationship between nitrates and premature mortality, and 
a third is the economic valuation of premature mortality. We evaluated 18 scenarios 
intended to span the set of plausible and commonly accepted visions of those uncertain 
elements. 
The paper examines three policy options. One is the currently planned policy for 
the eastern states known as the SIP region, labeled SIP Seasonal. Another, labeled SIP 
Annual, would extend the current policy to an annual basis in the SIP region. The third 
would extend the policy to be National Annual. A partial assessment of net benefits is 
used to compare the cost-effectiveness of the policies in the face of the uncertainties that 
are identified. 
The primary finding is that the SIP Annual policy appears more cost-effective 
than the SIP Seasonal policy in all 18 scenarios that are examined. The consideration of 
omitted benefits would only strengthen this ordinal ranking of the policies. The subset of 
the SIP region that includes 11 northeastern states in the OTR would benefit the most 
under the SIP Annual policy relative to SIP Seasonal, and the remaining eight states in 
the SIP region would benefit the least, but under no scenario are the remaining eight 
states made worse off due to the shift to the SIP Annual policy.  
One cannot make a similar claim about the relative cost-effectiveness of the 
National Annual policy. In half of the scenarios we examine, the National Annual policy 
appears more cost-effective than a SIP Seasonal policy, and in about half the order is 
reversed. However, the cost-effectiveness of a National Annual policy relative to the 
other policies is sensitive to benefits omitted from this analysis.  
This analysis has not explored the wisdom of the currently proposed policy 
compared to no policy, primarily because we assume that implementation of a policy at 
least as rigorous as the SIP Seasonal policy is required legally in order to meet federal 
clean air goals. Also, we provide only a partial accounting of benefits and costs, which is 
not sufficient to address the wisdom of the current policy.  
Nonetheless, based on this partial accounting, one can infer the magnitude of the 
omitted benefits that would be necessary for any of the policies to yield benefits in excess 
of costs. If ozone benefits fall toward the middle of the range identified in previous Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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studies, then the SIP Seasonal policy would achieve small positive net benefits. However, 
the SIP Annual policy would yield sizeable positive net benefits under this circumstance, 
and it would yield positive net benefits even if ozone benefits fall toward the lower end of 
its range. A National Annual policy also would yield positive net benefits in most 
scenarios if ozone benefits fall toward the middle or even toward the lower end of the 
range.   
In conclusion, we find that a SIP Annual policy is more cost-effective than a SIP 
Seasonal policy from a national and a regional perspective in every scenario we examine. 
A National Annual policy is likely to be more cost effective than a SIP Seasonal policy, 
but this depends on the value of omitted benefits and the scenario that is examined. Our 
findings support the conclusion of previous studies that the EPA and the states affected 
by the SIP Call should consider an annual alternative to the current seasonal approach to 
controlling NOX emissions. Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and McGuinness 
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